J.-F. GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS & D. JUTRAS, « L’expérience de l’École de droit de Science Po: observations d’outre-Atlantique », Commentaire, n° 159, automne 2017, 623-626
Ce texte se penche, d’un point de vue québécois, sur l’expérience de l’École de droit de Science-Po, à Paris. En France, la création de cette École a suscité la polémique en ce que l’initiative a été vue comme cherchant sciemment à rompre avec le modèle traditionnel des études de droit dans ce pays. Les auteurs estiment que l’École de droit de Science-Po reprend dans une large mesure le modèle nord-américain en vigueur pour les facultés de droit, avec ce que cela suppose en termes de sélection à l’entrée, de taille modeste ou d’intégration des activités cliniques dans le cursus. Aussi, saisies sous cet angle québécois et nord-américain, les dichotomies qui paraissent structurer les débats français sur la formation des juristes ne manquent donc pas d’étonner quelque peu. Mais au-delà des questions intéressant directement la philosophie sous-jacente à cette formation ainsi que son contenu, il semble difficile de les abstraire de la tension latente qui persiste en France entre universités et grandes écoles.
J.-F. GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, « Le droit de vote, la représentation effective et l'égalité des électeurs: de l'importance de prendre au sérieux un droit constitutionnel », (2017) 76 Revue du Barreau, 175-225
Cet article propose une relecture de l’arrêt Carter, dont il décrypte le sens et la portée à la lumière de la jurisprudence subséquente de la Cour suprême du Canada. Il se penche ensuite sur les jugements des autres tribunaux judiciaires ayant interprété le cadre analytique mis en place par la Cour suprême, en s’attardant aux problèmes particuliers que soulèvent la représentation des circonscriptions rurales et la protection des minorités. Enfin, il revient sur le rôle des tribunaux lorsqu’ils sont appelés à intervenir au regard des processus électoraux. Son auteur y soutient à cet égard que si une certaine déférence judiciaire peut se justifier, cette déférence ne saurait mener les tribunaux à abdiquer leur responsabilité de donner effet aux prescriptions de la Constitution du Canada. La déférence judiciaire ne devrait jamais les induire à rendre fonctionnellement non justiciables des droits constitutionnels justiciables, lesquels doivent impérieusement être pris au sérieux.
J.-F. GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, « Towards a Deontic-Axiomatic Theory of Federal Adjudication », dans: A. Lev (dir.), The Federal Idea. Public Law between Governance and Political Life, Oxford, Hart, 2017, 75-103.
This paper argues in favour of a principle-based, deontic approach to federalism and about the need to integrate such an approach in the legal theoretical reflection on this particular type of political regime. Its main thesis can be iterated as follows: not only can federalism be envisaged as a constitutional principle, it can also be represented as constituted of a set of foundational principles, which may provide, both in the daily life of a federation and in times of crisis, a deontic interval within which constitutional powers can, or should, be exercised. These principles can be derived or extrapolated from the fundamental structural characteristics common to all federations. Moreover, their identification can be inspired by the dynamic that results from the presence of such structural characteristics. As well, these principles refer us back to the initial goals of the political community constituted as a federation; those responsible for individuating them in particular cases assume an obligation of means to act in a manner that can reasonably be characterized as fostering those goals, or, to put it negatively, as not unduly undermining the said goals. In this respect, implementing such principles inevitably responds to a contextual logic of the possible,[1] and these principles then serve as “optimization precepts.” These principles, which could be characterized as “substantive”, must be distinguished from other types of principles, the mission of which is procedural, such as conflict and suppletive rules.
J.-F. GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, « The Role of Apex Courts in Federal Systems: Beyond the Law/Politics Dichotomy », [2017] 1 Jus Politicum. Revue de droit politique, 171-190
This article reexamines judicial interventions in federalism-related disputes, and, more specifically, whether apex courts should even play a role in them. It first maps out the main arguments raised against the judicial review of such disputes, after which it turns to those defending the judicial branch’s (somewhat) positive contribution to the evolution of federations . It observes that both positive and negative assessments of the judiciary’s role in a federation take on a normative and an empirical dimension. It then offers a defense of that contribution, while stressing the need to end the zero-sum approach to the law and politics relation that seems to inspire many of these assessments.
J.-F. GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS, « Can Quebec’s Relative Autonomy within Canada be a Template for Tibet? », dans: R. Toniatti & J. Woelk (dir.), Multinational Integration, Cultural Identity and Regional Self-Government. Comparative Experiences for Tibet, Londres, Routledge, 2017, 194-224
This paper examines whether the constitutional treatment of Quebec within Canada, under which a national cultural minority which forms a majority on a segment of the country’s territory is granted a rather significant level of autonomy, may provide a template for Tibet within the People’s republic of China. It first provides a historical account of how Quebec eventually managed to gain the relative autonomy it currently enjoys as a Canadian province. As it shows, the evolution of that society was sinuous; setbacks followed periods of progress, and maintaining a predominantly French-speaking society in an overwhelmingly English-speaking continent has always been, and remains, a work in progress. The paper then looks at five different questions which, together, are indicative of the nature and actual degree of autonomy enjoyed by Quebec within Canada. They are, in turn, the autonomous powers it is constitutionally allowed to exercise, the means by which it can affirm its cultural autonomy, the relations between groups within the province, the institutional guarantees that protect its status within the federation, and, last, its peculiar position regarding external relations. It then reflects on the conditions that led to the recognition of Quebec’s relative autonomy within Canada and on the thorny question as to whether this path is of any relevance to Tibet within the People’s Republic of China.
[1] Gustavo Zagrebelsky, « Ronald Dworkin’s principle based constitutionalism : An Italian point of view », (2003) 1 I-CON 621, 633.